WARDOG: Awareness Detection Watchdog for Botnet Infection on the Host Device by Hatzivasilis, G. et al.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SUSTAINABLE COMPUTING,  MANUSCRIPT ID 1 
 
WARDOG: Awareness detection watchdog for 
Botnet infection on the host device 
G. Hatzivasilis, O. Soultatos, P. Chatziadam, K. Fysarakis, I. Askoxylakis, S. Ioannidis, G. 
Alexandris, V. Katos, and G. Spanoudakis 
Abstract—Botnets constitute nowadays one of the most dangerous security threats worldwide. High volumes of infected 
machines are controlled by a malicious entity and perform coordinated cyber-attacks. The problem will become even worse in 
the era of the Internet of Things (IoT) as the number of insecure devices is going to be exponentially increased. This paper 
presents WARDOG – an awareness and digital forensic system that informs the end-user of the botnet’s infection, exposes the 
botnet infrastructure, and captures verifiable data that can be utilized in a court of law. The responsible authority gathers all 
information and automatically generates a unitary documentation for the case. The document contains undisputed forensic 
information, tracking all involved parties and their role in the attack. The deployed security mechanisms and the overall 
administration setting ensures non-repudiation of performed actions and enforces accountability. The provided properties are 
verified through theoretic analysis. In simulated environment, the effectiveness of the proposed solution, in mitigating the botnet 
operations, is also tested against real attack strategies that have been captured by the FORTHcert honeypots, overcoming 
state-of-the-art solutions. Moreover, a preliminary version is implemented in real computers and IoT devices, highlighting the 
low computational/communicational overheads of WARDOG in the field. 
Index Terms—computer crime, forensic, intrusion detection, intrusion prevention, network security, security management. 
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1 INTRODUCTION
He fight against botnets is ongoing for more than a 
decade now. According to Microsoft, around 1% of all 
machines that install updates automatically, are found 
infected with malware [1]. From one month to the next, 
most of these infected computers are unique which intui-
tively means that almost 1 in 10 users will experience an 
infection in the next year. 
Several countermeasures have been proposed [2], [3], 
[4], involving Internet Service Providers (ISPs), industry 
and governmental organizations, and end-users. The in-
fection rate has been reduced since the beginning of this 
war, and after 2009 it seems to be relative stable [5]. 
However, the financial cost and losses are still consid-
ered significant for the global economy [6]. Malwares 
have evolved from disruptive and highly visible at the 
early 2000s (ILOVEYOU, CODE RED, etc.), to stealthy 
code that resides undetectable in the victims machine as 
part of the criminal infrastructure (GAMEOVER ZEUS). 
Nowadays, cybercrime is organized in a Service Oriented 
Architecture (SoA) where botnet herders and malware 
authors can trade their assets in a market of attack-tools 
and integrated attack strategies [7], [8]. The criminal ac-
tivity involves, among others, Distributed Denial-of-
Service (DDoS) attacks, user credentials harvesting, finan-
cial fraud, spamming, hosting of phising sites, click fraud 
on advertising networks and so on [9]. 
Normally, the end-users do not bear the full cost of this 
botnet scourge, with ISPs undertaking the main mitiga-
tion efforts with the assistance of national initiatives (e.g. 
the London Action Plan (LAP) [10] that promotes anti-
botnet and anti-spam policies). However, ISPs are not 
incentivized by the market to mitigate botnets and several 
ISPs try to avoid this additional cost [11]. 
Nevertheless, the end-user plays a significant role con-
cerning the overall Internet security. This fact is becoming 
even more important with the evolution of the Internet of 
Things (IoT) where high volumes of personal and mobile 
devices must be protected against “botinization” [12], 
[13], [14], [15]. Marai botnet is an indicative case [16]. In a 
short period of six months, the malware had infected 
around 600,000 IoT devices, such as CCTV cameras with 
default passwords. Then on October 2016, the botnet per-
formed massive DDoS attacks, overwhelming several 
high-profile targets and leaving much of the Internet in-
accessible on the US east coast [17]. Thus, the more active 
involvement of the user should be considered as the next 
step towards a safer and sustainable Internet and the fur-
ther reduction of the abovementioned infection rate [5]. 
This paper proposes the WARDOG; an end-user 
awareness system for botnet mitigation on the infected 
machine’s side. Once a botnet attack is detected by a legit-
imate and trusted network entity, the involved infected 
machines are alerted. 
As a practical example, we consider the detection of a 
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DDoS attack by a web server or honeypot [18]. At the cur-
rent setting, the compromised equipment will continue 
serving the hacker’s commands even after the release of 
the attack and the exposure of the infected infrastructure. 
With the WARDOG now in place, the entity that is under 
the attack can send alert messages back to the machines 
that transmit the malicious traffic (based on the IP ad-
dress). WARDOG receives these messages at the device-
end and acts as an intrusion mitigation mechanism. It will 
automatically verify the entity’s claim based on locally 
logged information, block the malicious activity, and ad-
vise the user of the botnet’s infection. Then, the notified 
users can authorize the collection of logging data by an 
anti-virus program. The traces from the various compro-
mised machines are correlated in order to detect the han-
dler-bots at the adjacent layers that forward the attacker’s 
commands and remain hidden during the attack. Digital 
evidence is concentrated and automatically establishes 
legal documentation that can be used to prosecute the 
hackers. The proposed system’s key advantages include: 
1. Compatibility: No modifications are required on 
the Internet infrastructure. WARDOG is compati-
ble with the routing infrastructure and runs upon 
intra-domain routing and tunneling mechanisms. 
2. Transparency: The system is fully transparent to 
the end-user. It can protect legacy systems without 
any modifications to the client/server software 
applications. 
3. Scalability: WARDOG can protect a high volume 
of users and services on the global scale with low 
impact on legitimate entities. 
4. Versatility: A high variety of malicious activities 
can be effectively and efficiently mitigated. 
5. Economic incentive: No further economic impact 
to the ISPs or the end-users. 
6. Forensic/Accountability: The overall approach 
provides accountability and non-repudiation of 
performed actions (digital signatures, blockchain-
ing, etc.). The forensic documentation is produced 
from the processed data in an automatic manner. 
7. Cross-border digital investigation: As malware 
infection and botnet recruitment can spread all 
around the world, the proposed solution facilitates 
the collection of forensic data and the prosecution 
of the hackers despite the physical location of the 
victim or the involved machines. 
WARDOG develops a cost effective mechanism that 
tackles the critical factors towards a sustainable infor-
mation security and forensic computing framework. It 
has been properly designed to marshal important sus-
tainability aspects such as computational costs, resource 
usage, scalability, and energy efficiency. The overall solu-
tion is able in providing a suitable degree of security and 
forensic capability, and accomplishes sustainable security 
tracking and detection, effective machine intelligence to 
cyber-attacks, efficient information sharing and digital 
cyber-crime investigation. Moreover, our proposal is suit-
able for IoT ecosystems and other modern networks, with 
the overall operation causing no additional costs to the 
ISPs. 
The rest of the paper is organized as: Section 2 refers to 
background and related work, Section 3 outlines the 
WARDOG system operation, Section 4 presents the secu-
rity aspects of the proposed system. The related theoretic 
analysis is detailed in Section 5 and the provided forensic 
evidence is presented in Section 6. Section 7 shows the 
simulation outcomes while a real preliminary version is 
described in Section 8. Section 9 discusses the overall re-
sults and compares them with relevant studies. Finally, 
Section 10 concludes and refers future work. 
2 BACKGROUND & RELATED WORK 
Today, several botnets have been neutralized and ana-
lyzed by security experts [19], [20]. The general botnet 
architecture was firstly revealed via the analysis of the 
Torbig [19], with other significant efforts including the 
exposure of Botters [8] and Conficker [20]. Surveys for 
botnet attacks, attacker tools, and mitigation techniques 
are detailed in [2], [4], [9], [21], and [22]. 
2.1 Botnet Infrastructure 
A botnet [19], is typically defined as a network of infected 
end-hosts, called bots, which are controlled by one or 
more persons, known as bot-master/s. The botnet recruits 
vulnerable machines across the Internet utilizing several 
techniques that are exploited by various classes of mal-
ware (e.g. software flaws, social engineering, default sys-
tem configurations, etc.). The infected machines establish 
a Command and Control (C&C) infrastructure among them, 
in order to receive instructions from the bot-master and 
coordinate malicious activities. The main C&C functional-
ity [19], [20]: 
1. Facilitates monitoring and recovery by the bot-
master 
2. Provides robust network connectivity 
3. Limits the exposure of the botnet infrastructure 
that is visible by each distinct bot 
4. Supports individual encryption and control traffic 
dispersion 
Thus, the bot-master distributes commands to the bot 
armies via this C&C mechanism. Normally, the attacker 
establishes intermediate layers of bots, called handlers. 
Handlers forward the bot-master’s commands to other 
bots that they control directly. The communication finally 
reaches to the end-bots that actually perform the attack. 
Thus, the individual’s actual location and identity are 
concealed and the hacker is protected from the law au-
thorities. 
The communication channels can operate over various 
(logical) networks and utilize different communication 
means. Botnet management involves a series of systems 
and tools that typically install malicious code and control 
the victim via the Internet Relay Chat (IRC) [23]. None-
theless, the hacker can alter the communication approach, 
with several botnets nowadays supporting more than one 
protocol in order to incommode their detection (e.g. [8], 
[20], [24]). 
2.2 Attacks 
Commonly, botnets are exploited for launching DDoS 
attacks on computer networks, applications, or the Web in 
general [4], [9]. The current trend is the performance of 
DDoS attacks at the application layer [4], [9], [25]. It re-
mains among the most difficult issues to safeguard 
online, especially in the case of web servers. 
The most common strategy includes HTTP/S flooding 
[9] that is originated from the bots to the targeted server. 
The attack presupposes a high volume of bots that can 
continuously exhaust the server’s bandwidth and there-
fore prevent legitimate users from gaining access. 
As the end-bots that perform the attack do not need to 
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get any response back from the attacked server, they can 
send requests with spoofed IPs [26]. Each bot attacks the 
server with various fake IPs. The true IP address is kept 
hidden from the server and the deployed prevention 
mechanisms, like black-listed IPs from firewalls or other 
network monitoring tools, are overcome as the bot keeps 
changing addresses [27]. 
Moreover, the bot-master can further hide the end-bots 
via a layer of reflectors and attack the server indirectly 
[26].  Reflectors are non-compromised systems that exclu-
sively send replies to a request. The bots make requests to 
the reflectors using as spoofed IP, the IP address of the 
attacked server. Thus, the reflectors answer back to the 
server, performing the actual attack. 
Except from flooding, Slowloris constitutes a state-of-
the-art variant of DDoS [25], [28]. The attacker establishes 
many connections to the targeted server and keeps them 
open with minimum effort for as long as possible. The 
attack can be effectively performed with less bots than in 
flooding. Moreover, the bots consume less resources and 
this fact increases the possibility of remaining unnoticed 
by the owner of the compromised machine. 
The main difference between botnets and the typical 
malwares is the existence of the C&C. Thus, if we detect 
the location of the C&C, the botnet can be tracked and 
removed. This strategy exploits the possible weaknesses 
of the communication approaches that applied by the 
botnet. It is relatively easier to take down a centralized 
infrastructure. Therefore, as the detection mechanisms 
become more effective, hackers start moving towards 
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) and hybrid topologies [29], [30]. This 
comes with a cost of higher latency as the communication 
between the bot-master and the bots have to pass through 
several peers before reaching the end-host that will even-
tually perform the attack (i.e. HTTP flooding). On the 
bright side, it offers higher untraceability from the bot-
net’s persecutors [29], [30]. 
Undoubtedly, botnets can be utilized for a variety of 
malicious activities [9]. This paper considers all types of 
malicious botnet activity, however for our purposes, we 
will concentrate on DDoS techniques and demonstrate the 
effectiveness of our proposal in mitigating HTTP flooding 
[9] and Slowloris [25] attacks (Sections 5-7). 
2.3 Countermeasures 
Three types of botnet countermeasures are identified [4]. 
The first type prevents the setup of the botnet, blocks the 
infection of secondary victims and detects/neutralizes the 
botnet’s handlers. The second type deals with ongoing 
botnet attacks at runtime, including mechanisms that de-
tect, prevent, or mitigate the malicious activity. The third 
type utilizes forensics technologies that analyze the botnet 
characteristics, after a launched attack. 
The typical techniques for preventing systems from 
getting infected include anti-viruses/anti-malwares, fire-
walls, and patching [31]. Thus, malicious code is detected 
based on signatures, behavior and/or heuristic character-
istics [32]. Then, it is quarantined for further analysis or 
permanent deletion. Fruitful information is also collected, 
resolving the attacker’s tactics. The system’s vulnerabili-
ties are exposed and the legitimate software/hardware is 
updated accordingly. These mechanisms constitute an 
integral part of the overall defence. Except from protect-
ing single machines or networks their functionality is 
now extended to the Cloud [33]. 
However, these techniques cannot always protect the 
legitimate assets. An anti-virus, for example, can only 
discovery malicious patterns that are already known. 
Thereafter, an attacker can examine the scanning capabili-
ties of the protecting mechanism and apply a strategy to 
avoid detection (i.e. zero-days). 
Thus, anomaly detection approaches are suggested 
[34]. The normal operation of the system is recorded by 
machine learning components (e.g. based on fingerprint-
ing [35], fuzzy estimators [36], synergetic neural networks 
[37], or deep learning [38]). When a new type of attack is 
performed, the abnormal activity is tracked and mitiga-
tion policies are applied. So, DDoS attacks can be detected 
by network monitoring approaches that parse the traffic 
at runtime [36], [39]. Then, prevention mechanisms, like 
the Moving Target Detection (MTD) [40], can reduce the 
attack’s side-effects. BotFlex [41] is a state-of-the-art 
community-driven solution for network monitoring. The 
raw data of the inspected networking operations, which 
have been performed by the underlying machines, are 
transformed in high-level events (e.g. port scan, down-
load form site, or other transactions). An inference engine 
parses this information and tries to detect symptoms of 
malicious activities (formed as logic rules). One drawback 
is the high volume of data that must be processed. Thus, 
singular value decomposition from the Big Data filed are 
applicable here [42]. The high-order data dimensions are 
reduced, even for encrypted data [42], and the computa-
tional overhead is significantly reduced. 
On the other hand, stealthy DDoS strikes where the at-
tacker combines several different attacks instead of a sin-
gle and easily identified pattern, can overcome anomaly 
detection and statistical analysis [43]. Moreover, the legit-
imate organization must devote sufficient effort in order 
to deploy and keep up-to-date the defence measures [11]. 
Apart from these main safeguards at the system level, 
Internet-wide mechanisms are also developed by the ISPs 
to marshal the networking activity without the active in-
volvement of the end-users [44]. Although ISPs cannot 
take responsibility and lock down every customer’s in-
fected machine, they can at least ensure that they do not 
serve traffic that contains malicious packets. The main 
actions should include [45]: 
1. IP-spoofing: The provider should not forward 
traffic with spoofed IP addresses and all packets 
that contain any RFC 1918 or reserved IP address 
in the source or destination should be immediately 
discarded. 
2. Filtering: Ingress filtering should be performed for 
all the incoming packets to the ISP’s network. For 
traffic that is coming from a customer’s site, it 
should be verified that the NET_ID field in the 
source IP address matches the assigned NET_ID of 
this specific customer. Egress filtering should be al-
so applied in order to examine the outgoing traffic 
to upstream and peer ISPs. 
3. Broadcast: The IP directed broadcasts must be dis-
abled. 
4. High-profile entities: Careful attention should be 
paid for high-profile servers and customers. 
5. Dissemination: The customers could be educated 
in order to increase the security awareness and 
protect themselves. 
Ordinarily in botnets, the infected machines tend to 
connect malicious domains or Domain Name System 
(DNS) that are controlled by the bot-master in order to 
receive and respond to commands [19], [46]. If these 
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communication patterns to the C&C are identified by the 
ISP (e.g. router-based TCP/UDP inspection [47], honey-
pots [48]), the interaction can be repealed (e.g. blocking 
malicious domains/IPs, routing and DNS blacklist) [46]. 
Nevertheless, relying on detecting bot communication 
is not considered viable in the long term [23]. The C&C 
interaction can be extremely flexible and polymorphic, 
utilizing encryption or other masking techniques [23]. 
Forensics are utilized throughout these procedures to 
gather juridical data. This mainly includes honeypots, 
computer and network forensics [49], [50]. Yet, the high 
volume of participating machines/users, the global cov-
erence of bots, and, consequently, the various involved 
law authorities from different countries, pose great diffi-
culties in the prosecution of the wily hacker [51]. 
WARDOG concentrates in the last two classes of pro-
tection mechanisms (prevention of ongoing attacks and 
forensics), while contributing in the detection and neu-
tralization of the infected bots and handlers of the first 
line of defence (botnet’s setup and secondary victims). To 
our knowledge, this is the first attempt that tackles these 
three aspects in a concrete manner. Once an ongoing at-
tack is identified, the system stops the malicious activity 
in the host devices. Then, through crowdsourcing, the 
involved legitimate users can contribute in the collection 
of related data from their systems that are analyzed by 
security organizations (i.e. Computer Emergency Re-
sponse Teams (CERTs) and anti-virus companies). After 
several iterations, the bot-master can be traced back. Fo-
rensic information is automatically gathered throughout 
this process, resulting in adequate digital evidence that 
substantiates the malicious activity. 
3 WARDOG 
WARDOG is an active botnet mitigation mechanism that 
is applied on the end-users’ machines. It is considered a 
part of the mainstream security software. For example, 
the WARDOG functionality can be incorporated to a fire-
wall or an anti-virus. Its goal is threefold: i) stop the at-
tack, ii) inform the user that his/hers equipment is com-
promised, in order to perform a security upgrade and iii) 
provide adequate digital forensic/evidence that can po-
tentially lead to the bot-master’s identification, capture, 
and conviction. 
3.1 Traffic Monitoring at Normal Device Operation 
As aforementioned, botnet attacks do not always require 
to receive response traffic or acknowledgments from the 
target [26]. Thus, false IP addresses can be casted in order 
to hide the real bot/node source from the victim (target). 
The WARDOG component detects IP-spoofing in the 
end-user device. The outgoing traffic is filtered. When a 
packet is sent with an IP address that has not been as-
signed to this machine (or to any Virtual Machine (VM) 
that runs in the same system), the incident is recorded, the 
traffic is blocked and the user is prompted to take further 
actions, (similarly with the case of receiving a WARDOG 
alert from an attacked entity as described in the next sub-
section). Such an ingress filtering method can significant-
ly reduce the IP-spoofing and the indirect DDoS attacks 
via reflectors [52]. 
Moreover, to further constrain the bot’s capabilities 
and mitigate Slowloris, WARDOG performs a failed con-
nection (FC) mechanism [53] on the end-user’s machine. 
FC tracks the TCP connections towards a unique IP ad-
dress (e.g. packets with the TCP RST or TCP SYN flags). If 
the broken connections go beyond a threshold at a specif-
ic time-window, the new connection requests to this IP 
address are limited. 
Except from monitoring, the system also logs the ongo-
ing traffic. When an entity alleges that the machine partic-
ipates in an attack (e.g. HTTP flooding), the stored infor-
mation is utilized in order to verify the claim as it is de-
scribed in the following subsections. 
3.2 Under-Attack Functionality 
When a network entity is under an attack, like a web 
server that is hit by a DDoS, it deploys intrusion detection 
mechanisms that discern the malicious traffic and collect 
related information regarding the hacker’s strategy (e.g. 
[36], [35], [38], and [40]). However, at this point the victim 
can only utilize this data mainly for self-performing ac-
tions (e.g. discard packets from the suspicious sources) 
[40], [52]. 
3.2.1 First iteration – The bots’ layer 
With WARDOG now installed, as the attacked entity (AE) 
gathers evidence about the ongoing attack, it can inform, 
in real time, the directly involved end-user devices (bots) 
that are actively participating in the malicious effect. The 
entity provides digital evidence to each machine concern-
ing its claims. For example, part of the logged HTTP traf-
fic including the machine’s IP address as a source and the 
entity’s IP address as the destination (see Section 8). 
At first, the WARDOG component authenticates the 
AE (see Section 4 – security mechanisms). Then, it evalu-
ates the provided evidence by examining related log files 
that have been captured on the machine-end (i.e. network 
traffic logs). If the evidence is verified, WARDOG filters 
and blocks the outgoing traffic to the entity and prompts 
the user to take further actions. 
The user can choose to erase the constraint and permit 
future transmissions, denoting that he/she is aware of the 
transactions and the communication is legitimate (accept-
ing also the responsibility of this action). We expect that 
the high majority of the users will not unblock the inimi-
cal communication until they have fixed the security 
problem (i.e. anti-virus/anti-malware scan, operating 
system format, software/hardware upgrade). 
Thus, the distributed attack will be automatically 
stopped once detected, and the bots will be neutralized 
(see Section 6 – simulation study). The AE will continue 
sending WARDOG alarms though, if the device keeps 
sending traffic during the ongoing attack. This will be 
repeated at most three times per case, to reserve AE’s re-
sources and prevent attackers from exploiting the alerting 
procedure for their benefit. Only a small amount of the 
overall bots that are directly administrated by the attack-
ers are anticipated to remain active in the bots’ network. 
Consequently, it is then feasible for ISPs and network fo-
rensics to detect this small amount of devices and provide 
adequate evidence in order to accuse their owners in the 
court of law (e.g. [2], [3], [4]). However, we consider that 
this will not be the usual case, as bots are mostly owned 
by legitimate users and not by the bot-masters. 
3.2.2 Second iteration – The handlers’ layer 
After exposing the end-bots layer of the malicious infra-
structure at the first phase, we move forward in detecting 
the bot handlers. The compromised machines that partic-
ipated in the direct attack (end-bots) can further contrib-
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ute in the forensic efforts. 
Except from informing the user for the infection, 
WARDOG requests from the user to give his/hers explicit 
consent in order to transmit further information to a 
trusted cyber-security organization (i.e. the anti-virus 
company), which will analyze that attack-related data. We 
expect that a sufficient number of users will permit this 
interaction. Thus, log files are collected from various bots. 
The goal is to discover common communication patterns, 
investigate them further, and disclose the commands that 
where sent by the handlers. After excluding common traf-
fic from legitimate services, the security experts concen-
trate in the malicious data in order to isolate the IP ad-
dresses of the handler machines. The process can be per-
formed in an automated manner, similarly with the gen-
eral network monitoring forensic approach [21], [50]. 
As with the first phase, the WARDOG component of 
the machine will receive an alarm from the anti-virus 
server (AVS) informing the user that he/she is part of the 
handlers’ layer of the botnet. The digital evidence is a 
blockchain of the logs that were collected from the con-
trolled bots. It contains traffic patterns with the machine’s 
IP address as a source and each bot’s IP address as the 
destination. The WARDOG verifies the claim, blocks 
communication to the bot IPs, and prompts the user. As 
with the first bot-neutralization phase, we consider that 
the legitimate users that own the handlers will also coop-
erate and perform the same actions. 
3.2.3 Further iterations – The rest C&C infrastructure 
and the bot-master 
The second phase is then iterated several times. The idea 
is to continue discovering the C&C traffic in the various 
nested or P2P botnet layers until we find the malicious 
equipment and reach as close as we can to the bot-master. 
4 SECURITY PROTOCOLS 
Three security protocols are established in order to im-
plement the above mentioned interaction between the 
various entities: 
1. The AE detects an ongoing attack and informs the 
involved machines/end-bots. 
2. The user allows the local WARDOG component of 
the affected machine to gather data and distribute 
them to the correlated AVS. 
3. The AVS analyzes the collected local logs from the 
underlying machines and tracks their handlers. 
Then, AVS updates these machines regarding the 
infection. Protocol 2 can be repeated afterwards. 
The combination of 1 and 2 is performed once for each 
end-bot, when the attack is launched. Then, protocols 3 
and 2 are executed for several iterations as long as there 
exist contributing users on the various adjacent botnet 
layers. 
4.1 AE to end-bot communication 
At first, the end-bots start attacking the AE. The entity 
detects the malicious activity and records each suspicious 
IP (sIP). AE exports relevant sub-logs that contain the in-
volved traffic patterns from each sIP and sends the evi-
dence to the machines. Fig. 1 depicts the exchanged mes-
sages between the AE, the machine and the user. 
AE initiates the WARDOG interaction by distributing 
its digital certificate. It contains information about the AE 
and its public key (AEPU). 
Then, the entity creates an incident ID (IncID) for this 
specific attack. The IncID is formed by the entities identi-
fier (e.g. name, URL, IP address, etc.), the date, and a 
unique index that is generated randomly. 
The evidence for the attack contains the IncID, the rel-
evant sIP and sub-log, and a random nonce (nonce1). The 
evidence’s digest is signed with AE’s private key (AEPR). 
The result is sent to the corresponding bot. 
The WARDOG component on each end-user machine 
begins with the verification of AE’s certificate and the 
extraction of the AEPU. Then, it validates the integrity of 
the transmitted evidence. If the message has not been re-
played (based on nonce1) or altered (digest check), WAR-
DOG examines the sub-log’s events. If the same events 
have been also recorded in the local logs (local-log), the 
data is validated. 
The communication with the AE is blocked automati-
cally. The user is informed about the infection and can 
retain the restriction or unblock the interaction. 
4.2 Infected machine to AVS communication 
After the verification of the infection, the WARDOG com-
ponent prompts the user to send the local-log to the AVS 
for further processing. If the user grants his/hers explicit 
permission, the machine establishes a secure channel with 
the AVS, based on SSL similarly with the update pro-
gramming approaches that are commonly supported, 
where each software distribution comes with pinned 
asymmetric keys and the public key of the communi-
cating server [54], [55], [56], [57], [58]. The result is the 
session key SK that encrypts the subsequent messages. 
Fig. 2 illustrates the communication protocol. 
The machine sends a message (encrypted with SK) that 
contains the AE’s message (including the IncID and evi-
dence for the attack), the local-log, and a nonce (nonce1). 
AVS decrypts the message with the SK and retrieves the 
data. It can (optionally) re-verify AE’s evidence. An entry 
is created for the IncID in the local data base, if there is 
none yet, and the local-log is stored. 
Henceforth, AVS can correlate the communicating pat-
terns from several infected machines for this specific 
event and detect the handlers in the adjacent botnet layer. 
The outcome is structured as a set of blockchains for eve-
ry identified handler. For each initial message M a chain 
is created that contains the trace from the AE to the speci-
fied machine. The related digital certificate for the AE is 
also included. The evidence is sent to the handler ma-
chine, as it is described in the next subsection. 
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4.3 AVS to handler communication 
The AVS initiates the communication with the handler by 
establishing an SSL connection, as in the previous com-
munication protocol. Then, AVS encrypts the evidence 
blockchain and transmits it to the machine. 
The handler extracts the AE’s public key and verifies 
the initial claims for the attack. For each message M, the 
machine can track back the logged activity. The final node 
of each chain includes the participation of the handler. 
This is contrasted with the local-log. If the malicious activi-
ty is verified, the user is informed accordingly as in the 
rest of the cases. 
5 THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
This section details the theoretical analysis of our pro-
posal and its effectiveness in countering the attacker 
models that are detailed in the simulation study (Section 
7). 
5.1 Protocol Analysis 
The theoretic security analysis of the communication links 
between the involved entities and the WARDOG compo-
nent is modelled in the verification tool ProVerif [59] (the 
code is not included in this document due to the page 
limit). It is a widely-used automatic symbolic protocol 
verifier that proves the security properties of the exam-
ined protocol, like authentication, secrecy, and adversary 
equivalence aspects. The examined protocol is modelled 
in a process calculus and is automatically translated in 
Horn clauses [59]. The tool resolves these clauses and de-
termines if the security properties hold or not. In case 
where all properties are validated, ProVerif returns 
“true”. Otherwise, it outputs the properties that could not 
be satisfied. 
5.1.1 Attack-notification by AE 
The initial communication between the AE and the end-
bot machines provides only one-way authentication 
without secrecy. No prior knowledge is required, the AE 
does not receive any response back and the exchanged 
data is already known to the attacker. This approach ena-
bles a lightweight and fast reaction of the entity that is 
under the botnet’s attack and its computation-
al/communicational capabilities are strained (see Section 
8 – Implementation). 
ProVerif validates that the interaction is safe, achieving 
the authentication of the sender, integrity, and immunity 
to replay attacks. Alternatively, a secure channel could be 
set up in order to accomplish confidentiality (as it is used 
for the rest interactions that are described below). 
5.1.2 Interaction between AVS and the infected 
machines 
The interaction between the anti-virus server and the end-
user machines imposes two-way authentication. At first, 
both parties must authenticate each other. The process is 
similar with the SSL handshake phase [60]. The result also 
includes a session key that is randomly generated by the 
second participant and is securely transmitted to the first 
one that initiates the interaction (see subsections 4.2 and 
4.3). Then, the two parties use this key to encrypt the ex-
changed data, as with the SSL record phase [60]. 
ProVerif evaluates the various protocol steps and vali-
dates that the overall setting provides, authentication, 
confidentiality, integrity, and immunity to replay attacks. 
5.1.3 Blockchaining 
Finally, the blockchaining enforces non-repudiation of the 
main performed actions. ProVerif validates the blocks’ 
integrity, authenticity, and privacy, and consequently the 
security of the implemented chains [61]. The chaining 
approach offers the required authorship and accountabil-
ity of each contributing participant, either for the attacked 
entity that informs about the ongoing incidents or the 
involved end-user machines that distribute their forensic 
data. 
 
Fig. 2. Communication between the infected machine and AVS. 
 
Fig. 1. Communication between AE and end-bot. 
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5.2 Botnet Mitigation 
The theoretical security analysis for the WARDOG’s effec-
tiveness in mitigating the botnet’s operations is per-
formed in three steps. First, we prove that packet loss due 
to an attack is bounded (Theorem 1). Then, we argue that 
WARDOG’s success is determined by the end-user’s 
compliance with the AE’s call to block the communication 
(Lemma 1 and 2). Finally, we evince that WARDOG can 
still mitigate the attack even without the full compliance 
of the end-users (Theorem 2). 
We start by providing some definitions and then the 
theorems and the proofs. 
Definition 1: Let pkt	 + be the total number of success-
fully transmitted packets. 
Definition 2: Let pkt		 	– be the total number of lost pack-
ets. 
Definition 3: Let Tpkt be the total number of transmit-
ted packets, determined as the summation of pkt	+ and pkt			–
. 
Definition 4: Let ρ be the transmission success rate of 
the totally transmitted packets Tpkt. 
5.2.1 Bounded packet loss due to the attack 
Theorem	1:	The	ideal	network	exhibits	𝑝𝑘𝑡9 − 𝜌 ∙ 𝑝𝑘𝑡= ≤
0.	For	up	to	an	additive	constant,	ignoring	a	bounded	num-
ber	φ	of	packets	lost,	it	holds	that	the	number	of	lost	pack-
ets	 is	 a	 ρ-fraction	 of	 the	 number	 of	 transmitted	 packets.	
Specifically,	 there	exists	an	upper	bound	φ,	as	described	 in	
(1).	
𝑝𝑘𝑡9 − 𝜌 ∙ 𝑝𝑘𝑡= ≤ 𝜑										(1) 
Proof: Assume that there are N nodes, m of which are 
malicious and m<N. Let MIPs be the set of IPs that are 
controlled by the malicious nodes (bots). 
Let	β	be	the	number	of	served	packets	that	exposes	an	IP	
as	suspicious	or	malicious	when	a	DDoS	attack	 is	detected.	
The	 number	 of	 convictions	 ce	 is	 at	 least	 UVW
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By combining (1) and (4), we derive: 
𝑝𝑘𝑡9 − 𝜌 ∙ 𝑝𝑘𝑡= ≤ 𝛽 ] (𝑟_ − 𝑐_)
_bcdef
≤ 𝛽 ∙ 𝑀𝐼𝑃𝑠										(5)	
Since 𝛽 = 𝑏 ∙ 𝑚, where b is the number of malicious 
packets that are served per window, (4) becomes: 
𝑝𝑘𝑡9 − 𝜌 ∙ 𝑝𝑘𝑡= ≤ 𝑏 ∙ 𝑚 ∙ 𝑀𝐼𝑃𝑠										(6) 
Therefore, the amount of disruption an attacker can 
cause to the network is bounded. If there are no malicious 
nodes (6) describes the ideal case, where 𝑝𝑘𝑡9 − 𝜌 ∙
𝑝𝑘𝑡= ≤ 0.     ■ 
5.2.2 Correlation between the user’s compliance and 
the disruptive capabilities of WARDOG 
Lemma 1: The WARDOG proof alerting can decrease 
the attack rate. 
Proof: Based on (6), it is derived that b_up≥b_wd, where 
m_up and m_wd are the number of malicious nodes per 
window with no protecting mechanism in place and with 
the WARDOG proof alerting, respectively. ■ 
Lemma 2: The mitigation rate of WARDOG is directly 
affected by the end-users compliance with the AE’s re-
quest to block the malicious traffic. 
Proof: The probability of blocking (pBL) an end-bot from 
continuing the attack is described in (7): 
0 ≤ (𝑝tu = 𝑝vw ∙ 𝑝vx) ≤ 1										(7) 
Where pUS is the probability of unspoofed IP addresses 
and, thus, the verification of AE’s evidence, and pUC is the 
probability of user’s compliance with the AE’s request. 
We assume that the ingress filtering mechanism of WAR-
DOG will prevent spoofing at the device (pUS=1). Then, 
from (6) and Lemma 1, we can derive that the higher the 
user’s compliance (pUC), the lower the attacker’s bounded 
effect. 
As attacking nodes exceed the malicious threshold 
(malthr) during the congested period of the DDoS, they are 
detected and excluded (𝜌 ∙ 𝑝𝑘𝑡= ≥ 𝑚𝑎𝑙W}~ → (𝑚 = 𝑚−
1)). The attack rate is further decreased as MIPs is de-
creased. If all attackers are detected MIPs becomes 0, re-
sulting also the ideal case.    ■ 
5.2.3 Attacker’s effort and level of user compliance 
Theorem 2: The WARDOG does not require the abso-
lute compliance of end-users in order to effectively miti-
gate a DDoS attack. 
Proof: Consider that pktmax is the maximum volume of 
packets that can be sent be a node in N. The upper bound 
for the current traffic (CT) to the AE is at most: 
𝐶𝑇 = 𝐿𝑇 +𝑀𝑇 ≤ 𝑁 ∙ 𝑝𝑘𝑡					(8) 
Where CT is the summation of the legitimate (LT) and 
malicious (MT) traffic, respectively. 
The malicious effect starts as the CT exceeds the AE’s 
bandwidth (B), as shown in (9): 
𝐶𝑇 = 𝐿𝑇 +𝑀𝑇 > 𝐵						(9) 
Then, the attack is detected by the AE’s IDS and the 
WARDOG informs the user’s to stop this activity. The 
positive effect of the defence is described in (10), as the 
blocked malicious traffic (BMT): 
𝐵𝑀𝑇 ≤ 𝑝𝑘𝑡 ∙ ] 𝑝tu,_
_∈cdef
										(10) 
Henceforth, from (8) and (10), we derive: 
𝐶𝑇 = 𝐿𝑇 +𝑀𝑇 −𝐵𝑀𝑇						(11) 
With the full compliance of the end-users (𝑝tu,_=1 for 
all 𝑒 ∈ 𝑀𝐼𝑃𝑠), all detected bots stop the malicious traffic to 
the AE (BMT=MT). CT is now containing only legitimate 
traffic which is normally less than B. Thus, no packet loss 
is caused due to the attack. 
Even with a lower level of compliance, the attack can 
still be countered. In order to initiate the malicious effect 
and make the AE not serving requests, the botnet must fill 
up the remaining bandwidth	(𝑀𝑇 > 𝐵 − 𝐿𝑇). Thus, there 
is a volume of bots that can remain active (not blocked by 
the end-user) while no side-effect is being noticed by the 
AE’s legitimate users (𝑀𝑇 ≤ 𝐵 − 𝐿𝑇). 
Nevertheless, even when this ratio is overcome by the 
botnet, legitimate requests can still be served. The service 
is degraded but not denied completely. In order to ac-
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complish the absolute denial of the service, the malicious 
traffic volume must be significantly higher than the re-
maining traffic (𝑀𝑇 ≫ 𝐵 − 𝐿𝑇). Thus, there can be a toler-
ance threshold of uncompliant end-users (UCthr) under 
which service is still provided to legitimate requests. ■ 
6 FORENSICS 
The section describes the forensics features that are ena-
bled with WARDOG. These are summarized as automati-
cally generated and self-validated documentation, and 
enhanced cross-border digital investigation. 
6.1 Forensics and Automatically Generated 
Documentation 
The supported communication protocols validate the col-
lected information and accomplish non-repudiation for 
the contributing data (i.e. through digital signatures and 
blockchaining). The overall security setting confirms the 
malicious activity and the accountability of a potentially 
identified attacker. 
The AE creates the incident ID (IncID) representing the 
forensic identification for the specific case. The overall 
forensics evidence that is provided by the WARDOG in-
cludes: 
1. The digital certificates (X.509) of each involved 
participant (CA, AVS, AE, end-user machines). 
2. The blockchains that were collected by the AVS 
and entailed the initial evidence for the involve-
ment in the bots’ layer. Each chain contains the in-
cident claim, made by the AE, and the related veri-
fication of a specific bot. 
3. The blockchains that were constructed by the AVS 
and include the secondary evidence for the in-
volvement in the rest botnet layers. Each chain 
contains the communication patterns between 
botnet nodes of adjacent layers, which have been 
verified by both parties (the bot and its handler). 
4. The integration of the two abovementioned evi-
dence sources for each contributing anti-virus or-
ganization to a unitary documentation by the law 
enforcement authorities or other collaborating or-
ganizations (i.e. CERTs). 
The final document can act as an official record for this 
cyber-incident and utilized by the law authorities in case 
hackers or malicious equipment have been traced. More-
over, the document can be distributed between the in-
volved entities (i.e. lawyers, victims, judges), with the full 
content being validated automatically (offline) through a 
recursive verifier. 
6.2 Cross-Border Digital Investigation 
It is almost the norm for botnets to extend their function-
ality across several countries [48], [49]. However, interna-
tional cooperation in digital investigations remains a chal-
lenging task [51]. The collection of cross-border evidence 
raises many issues including data authorization, different 
legislation and investigation capabilities, and which au-
thority has the command for the process. 
It is common practice for hackers to attack the target 
that is deployed in one country through bots that lay in 
another country with which there is a conflict (i.e. attack-
ing a web server in USA with bots that are located in Chi-
na). With WARDOG, the security organizations can gath-
er the appropriate information via crowdsourcing. The 
end-users authorize the distribution of timely and ade-
quate data, assisting both in the mitigation of the threat 
and the prosecution of the liable persons [62]. To our 
knowledge, this is a unique feature of the proposed solu-
tion that is not handled properly by the current forensic 
solutions in such a systematic and automatic manner. 
7 SIMULATION STUDY 
The largest reported DDoS attack was recorded against 
GitHub in 2018 [63]. The attack launched from over a 
thousand of different autonomous systems across tens of 
thousands of unique endpoints. It exhausted the victim’s 
memory resources that peaked at 1.35Tbps via 126.9 mil-
lion of packets per second. The hacker exploited thou-
sands of misconfigured Memcached servers, many of 
which are still vulnerable over the Internet and can be 
utilized again for more massive hits. 
This section presents the simulation results for WAR-
DOG and its effectiveness in mitigating the large scale 
malicious activity of a botnet. In order to simulate our 
proposal under a realistic attack environment, we further 
analyze the malicious traffic patterns (e.g. worm, SYN 
floods, etc.) that have been captured by a system of dis-
tributed honeypots that was run by the FORTHcert [48], 
[49], since 2014. We establish the various simulation as-
pects that are detailed below based on these observations 
and the investigated hacker strategies. 
7.1 Attack Mitigation 
The simulated botnet launches HTTP flooding (make a 
vast amount of requests to the victim) [9] attacks. The bots 
perform HTTP flooding on attacks on a central access-
point (i.e. a server). 
 
Fig. 3. Simulated DDoS attack with 50,000 end-bots. The red dots 
represent the infected IPs. 
 
Fig. 4. The Current Traffic (CT) of the various simulated attack sce-
narios 
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The Botnet Simulator (BoNeSi) [64] is utilized for this 
study, which emulates a system of 50,000 bots. The simu-
lator generates realistic traffic patterns for TCP and UDP 
flows, and enables the configuration of several network-
ing aspects, like, the number of IP addresses, the total 
packets per second and the data volume that are sent to 
each target. Table 1 summarizes the specific simulation 
parameters that are applied for this study. 
The PyGeolpMap [65] plots the involved IP addresses 
on a world map, as depicted in Fig. 3. The botnet is 
spread in almost every country with sufficient Internet 
infrastructure. The high majority of the infected machines 
is located in Europe and North America. 
The bots perform a SYN flooding DDoS on the legiti-
mate web server through port 80. The bots send bursts of 
1000 packets, with a packet generation frequency of 10, 
30, or 60 packets per second. The average bots bandwidth 
is 22 Kbps, with the total botnet’s attacking-power ex-
ceeding the 1 Gbps on average [66]. 
Based on the theoretical results, WARDOG’s effective-
ness is strongly affected by the user’s cooperation (puc). We 
stress the system’s responsiveness to the attack for puc = 
1.0, 0.8, and 0.5 level of compliance to the mitigation ef-
fort. 
Each experiment was performed 10 times and the av-
erage values were recorded. Fig. 4 illustrates the evalua-
tion results. When the current traffic (CT) exceeds the 90% 
of the AE’s bandwidth (B=1 Mbps) the potential IDS de-
tects the attacking IPs. Therefore, the threshold for the AE 
to start the communication with the machines/bots is 
overcome before the maximum bandwidth is filled up 
(alternative, the AE could deploy a redundant/alternative 
communication link for higher resilience). The WARDOG 
components are informed and block the malicious activity 
based on the puc level of each case (i.e. BoNeSi stops send-
ing traffic with these IPs). As time progresses and more-
and-more malicious IPs are blocked, the malicious traffic 
(MT) is increased with smaller rates. 
As is evidence, for high collaboration degrees (puc ≥ 0.8) 
the malicious activity is circumscribed and the attack ratio 
is retain below the AE’s bandwidth. If the interplay with 
the end-users is moderate (puc ≈ 0.8) the operational quality 
is degraded, but legitimate users can still be served by the 
AE. The attack can be successful for low volume of con-
tributing users (puc < 0.5). Nevertheless, the gather forensic 
data could trace back part of the malicious infrastructure 
afterwards. 
In this simulation study, we evaluate the effectiveness 
of WARDOG for different levels of user compliance, rang-
ing from 50%-100%. As we mentioned before, we consider 
that even if the users do not want to participate in the 
crowdsourcing functionality, they will block the potential 
attack with high probability (to retain their own re-
sources). Thus, we estimate that a compliance value of 0.8 
< puc < 0.9 will represent the normal state in real incidents. 
The overall discussion regarding the user’s compliance 
also reflects the efficacy of the WARDOG approach in 
case of partial adoption level by the general audience. 
7.2 Botnet’s Exposure 
Apart from being part of the first line of defence, the pro-
posed system can track the nested botnet layers. We in-
vestigate the capabilities of WARDOG to dig out the bot-
master in an emulated environment with the Network 
Simulator 3 (NS3) and the NS Network Animator 
(NSNAM) [67]. 
A botnet of 50,000 bots is modelled again. This time we 
consider that the user’s compliance ratio is fixed at puc = 0.9 
and we vary the botnet’s topology. We track the trace 
originated from a single bot-master towards the end-bots. 
Four main scenarios are investigated: 
1. Scenario 1: the bot’s are controlled directly by the 
bot-master. 
2. Scenario 2: a layer of handlers is intercepted with 
each handler commanding one end-bot (1-1 rela-
tion). 
3. Scenario 3: each handler controls a small percent-
age of the overall end-bots (10%-30%). 
4. Scenario 4: a P2P network of handlers is added be-
tween the bot-master and the handlers of the pre-
vious case. 
Fig. 5 depicts the examined topologies.  
We perform a single experiment for each of the two 
first cases, as the outcome was deterministic. In the third 
scenario, we execute 10 iterations where the control rate 
for each handler was assigned randomly (between 10%-




Simulator BoNeSi, NS3 
Visualization PyGeolpMap, NSNAM 
Bots (IP addresses) 50,000 
Attack Type HTTP Flooding 
Packet payload 32 bytes 
Packets per second 5000 
Average bot’s bandwidth (MT) 22 Kbps 
Average botnet’s bandwidth 1 Gbps 
AE’s max bandwidth (B) 1 Mbps 
Service port 80 
Average legitimate traffic (LT) 10 Kbps 
User’s compliance (pUC) 1, 0.9, 0.8, or 0.5 
 
 
Fig. 5. The four main botnet topologies as modelled in NS3/NSNAM 
(A. Scenario 1, B. Scenario 2, C. Scenario 3, and D. Scenario 4). 
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peers each for: i) 1-1 relations among the peers, ii) binary 
tree connection, and iii) links with higher granularity. For 
each setting, we perform 10 experiments for random con-
trol rates at the handler layer, similarly with the previous 
synthesis. The average results are reported below. 
The direct control of the bots is the worst case scenario 
for the attacker (scenario 1). The derived evidence is strong 
as his/hers digital footprint is testified by all infected ma-
chines. 
The best concealing strategy for the hacker can be 
achieved with a 1-1 analogy of handlers and end-bots 
(scenario 2). However, the adversary must pay a great cost 
of reducing the total attacking force in the half. WARDOG 
stops the attack at the end-bots but cannot spot the han-
dlers at this point. Nevertheless, the collected forensic 
data can be kept by the AVS and reveal these unique han-
dlers once there are utilized again in another incident. 
Moreover, the mitigation mechanisms that try to figure 
out the communication channels of the botnet are appli-
cable here (e.g. [35], [38]). Such mechanisms analyze the 
collected data and discover the various interaction op-
tions of the botnet. This information could then be pro-
vided to the WARDOG components in order to expose 
the handler machines. 
The two last tested scenarios would be the most com-
mon cases in real attacks. The handlers that command the 
end-bots are easily spotted even for smaller controlling 
ratios (lower than 10%). This always leads to the bot-
master’s detection for the scenario 3, with quite strong 
evidence. In the final set, the P2P links are exposed as 
long as there is not a 1-1 relation among the peers and the 
attacker is also convicted (scenarios 4.ii and 4.iii). Other-
wise (scenario 4.i), the forensic procedure is similar as in 
scenario 2. 
8 IMPLEMENTATION AND PERFORMANCE 
EVALUATION 
A testbed is evaluated on real machines. The research 
cloud platform GRNET Virtual MAchines (ViMA)1 is uti-
lized for the main server functionality. Two VMs are in-
stalled (Intel Core i7 at 2.1 GHz CPU, 8GB RAM, 64-bit 
OS Windows 8.1 Pro) that represent a simple web server 
as the AE and the set of three AVS services that collect the 
forensic data, respectively. 
As mentioned in the introductory sections, the high 
volume of the IoT devices can be exploited for massive 
botnet attacks (e.g. [14], [15]). Novel security mechanisms 
have to be scalable and deal with the heterogeneity of the 
IoT ecosystem. Thus, we justify the feasibility of WAR-
DOG by applying it in three different types of end-user 
devices (as identified in our previous work in the IoT 
domain): i) a laptop that controls a smart campus [68], ii) 
a smart phone that acts as the infotainment system of a 
smart vehicle in a Vehicular Ad hoc Network (VANET) 
setting [69], iii) and a BeagleBone embedded device that 
gathers environmental parameters in a Wireless Sensor 
Network (WSN) for precision agriculture [70]. The devic-
es’ features are detailed in Table 2. Each of these devices 
participates in an emulated botnet that performs a DDoS 
attack in the targeted web server. 
As a case study, we develop the WARDOG operation 
in three different open source anti-virus, one for each one 
of the three deployed devices. For the laptop (power node 
with sufficient computational/communicational capabili-
ties), we extend the functionality of ClamWin2 – a variant 
for Windows of the most widely-used open source anti- 
1 GRNET ViMA: https://vima.grnet.gr/about/info/en/ 





















Anti-virus ClamWin CyberGod ClamAV 





C++ Java C++ 
CPU model Intel Core i7 Krait 400 AM3359 ARM 
Cortex-A8 
Frequency 2.1 GHz 2.5 GHz 500-720 MHz 
Cores 6 4 1 
RAM 8GB 16GB 256MB 
Internet 
connectivity 












40.0 / - /- 10.2 / - /- 
User device 
Local traffic logging 
and filtering 
35.0 / 35.0 /36.0 34.0 / 40.0 /41.0 
One-way authenti-
cation 
7.0 / 8.0 / 8.6 0.3 / 0.2 / 2.8 
Mutual authentica-
tion & session estab-
lishment 
11.5 / 20.0 / 65.0 10.7 / 2.1 /94.7 
Verification of bot 
participation 
0.5 / 0.5 /0.5 0.2 / 0.6 /1.0 
Verification of han-
dler participation 
1.5 / 1.5 / 1.5 0.5 / 1.5 /2.2 
AVS contribution 
Discovery of han-
dlers from received 
local logs 
80.0 / - /- 20.3 / - /- 
Each parameter describes the resource consumption for [PC] / [Smart 
phone] / [Embedded device].  
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virus for research purposes ClamAV3. For the smart phone 
(mobile personal device with moderate efficiency), we 
install the Android application of CyberGod4. For the 
BeagleBone (embedded device with constrained re-
sources), we deploy the core ClamAV that runs on Linux. 
ClamWin/ClamAV are implemented in C++ and Cyber-
God is implemented in Java. For cryptographic opera-
tions (e.g. digital signatures, file digests, etc.), the Clam-
Win/ClamAV utilize the OpenSSL [60], while in the case 
of CyberGod we have to import the cryptographic library 
Bouncy Castle [71]. 
The system’s network communication is binded in the 
port 9090 for each machine. Benchmarks were performed 
consisting of dummy traffic patterns that trigger several 
times the WARDOG functionality in each entity. Table 3 
summarizes the average resource consumption in the 
three platforms (the transmission time has been excluded 
as it is strongly determined by the potential application 
environment). 
The AE only sends the initial alerting messages. The 
cost is one message per bot, which corresponds to 40KB of 
RAM and 10.2 ms CPU time. The AE is supposed to have 
already in place logging mechanisms that would perform 
similarly with the reported WARDOG logging and filter-
ing components. 
At the client side, WARDOG captures the network traf-
fic, creating a log file that is compatible with the widely-
used PCAP format5 (each PCAP entry in the log repre-
sents one transaction and requires around 40 bytes to be 
stored). Fig. 6 illustrates an example trace from a local log 
file for the WiFi traffic of the evaluated laptop. The trace 
highlights the transmission of data from the laptop to the 
AE. The AE provides as evidence its own version of the 
trace, capturing the laptop’s interaction. The WARDOG 
installation at the device-end, correlates the two tracks 
and if the evidence is verified the communication is 
blocked. The local traffic logging and filtering parameter 
represents the runtime overhead of WARDOG during 
normal operation. As is evident, the additional effort is 
low (around 35-36KB RAM for 34-41 ms processing) and 
feasible even for embedded devices. When an attack is 
launched, the authentication and validation procedures 
are also efficient and adequate for operation in real-time 
settings. 
The authentication is the same for the AVS (PC meas-
urements). The main contribution of the AVS is the analy-
sis of the received local logs from the infected machines 
and the induction of the handler IPs. The processing time 
is the most important aspect. The achieved delay is decent 
for our study as it enables the system to send evidence to 
the handler devices that can be verified in a factual period 
of time (before the machine changes the current IP ad-
dress). 
In the case of IoT devices with minimal or absent inter-
face with the user, the device will block its participation in 
the attack and raise an alarm to its controller or gateway. 
These intermediate equipment should then inform the 
user afterwards. If the device’s resources are constrained, 
the full WARDOG functionality could be also performed 
by these equipment (e.g. network logging). 
 
3 T. Kojm, ‘ClamAV’: http://www.clamav.net/ 
4 CyberGod: https://www.codeproject.com/Tips/1179918/CyberGod-
An-Antivirus-in-Cplusplus-for-Windows-and 
5 Libpcap File Format: 
https://wiki.wireshark.org/Development/LibpcapFileFormat 
9 DISCUSSION AND COMPARISON WITH OTHER 
SYSTEMS 
As aforementioned in the introductory sections, the cur-
rent protection approaches target specific aspects of the 
overall defence against botnets. Their interplay is not al-
ways administrated and some vulnerabilities can lead to 
security breaches. WARDOG acts as an additional safe-
guard that can interoperate with these solutions and 
shield the legitimate operation. Moreover, the enhanced 
forensic capabilities permit the cross-border investigation 
and the conviction of the bot-masters. 
The active involvement of the end-user’s machine that 
is utilized by our system, is mainly proposed by offensive 
protection mechanisms. For example, the system in [72] 
proposes that in case of DDoS, the legitimate users should 
‘speak-up’ and increase their request volume. Thus, the 
legitimate traffic could exceed the bounded malicious 
bandwidth, with the AE serving several requests (as it 
was also discussed in Theorem 2 → 𝑀𝑇 ≫ 𝐵 − 𝐿𝑇). 
However, the AE is still receiving a vast amount of traf-
fic. Thus, an extension is proposed in order to perform the 
decision making closer to the edge network and permit a 
constrain number of the speak-up traffic to reach the tar-
get [73]. Yet, the countermeasure is effective only if a de-
cent volume of legitimate users are interacting with the 
AE during the attack (otherwise the LT will not overcome 
the MT). 
Nevertheless, the criticism against such offensive tech-
niques is the fact that they can be exploited for malicious 
operations as well. An attacker can manipulate the under-
lying procedures in order to perform an attack. Consider 
an IoT setting where the user accesses Internet services 
via his/hers smart phone. The activation of [72], [73] 
would increase the requests that are made by the device, 
and consequently, the economic charge and the energy 
dissipation. WARDOG overcomes these problems, im-
plementing secure and lightweight procedures that can-
not be used for attacks. 
Other defence approaches suggest the utilization of a 
pricing method, where the interacting entities will devote 
some effort in order to designate their legitimacy. The 
Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Comput-
ers and Human Apart (CAPTCHA) is the indicated choice 
[74], [75]. Once a new request is made, the server de-
mands from the clients to solve the CAPTCHA test. The 
 
Fig. 6. Example trace visualized with WireShark. 
12 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SUSTAINABLE COMPUTING,  MANUSCRIPT ID 
 
goal is discriminate if the request has been made by a 
human or a bot. Yet, designing secure CAPTCHAs that 
can be managed efficiently by the AE is not a trivial task 
[76], [77]. If the tests are lightweight, the crea-
tion/verification burden for the server is low, but the at-
tacker can also resolve them easier. On the other hand, if 
the riddles are hard, they would result higher false nega-
tives for the legitimate participants [77]. Also, these 
methods cause delays not only during the attack but in 
normal operation as well, and are annoying for most us-
ers. 
Table 4 summarizes the qualitative comparison results. 
The WARDOG offers a unique functionality that tackles 
several important and practical security aspects which are 
not handled by the current solutions in such a solid and 
systematic way. 
Additionally, the performance of WARDOG, en-
hanced/simple speak-up, and CAPTCHA mitigation ap-
proach is evaluated with qualitative metrics. We model 
the 4 systems in the simulation setting of Section 7 for 
mitigating the Scenario 1 botnet (50,000 end-bots). We 
deploy the WARDOG-0.8 synthesis (80% of user compli-
ance). For the enhanced/simple speak-up phase, we de-
termine that each legitimate entity will reach its maxi-
mum bandwidth (22 Kbps). In the case of CAPTCHA, we 
consider a secure puzzle method that will not be over-
whelmed by the attacker and impose an average 5 sec 
delay to the user, with no false attempts (this is the opti-
mal option for the scheme, as in a real-world application 
there will be both false positives and negatives). 
We evaluate the defence mechanisms based on three 
performance metrics. We estimate their mitigation effec-
tiveness (percentage of unique legitimate requests that are 
processed by the AE) and make observations regarding 
the overall traffic that reaches the AE and connection es-
tablishment latency. 
We test the systems for different volume of legitimate 
nodes which send traffic concurrently. Fig. 7, depicts the 
main evaluation results regarding the effectiveness of 
each system, as the average the delivery ratio (the higher, 
the better). An indicative web site that has an average of 
150,000 visitors per month would expect 417 requests per 
hour, while a typical DDoS attack would conscript several 
thousands of bots [17]. The WARDOG can successfully 
stop the malicious traffic and serve all legitimate visits. 
However, this is not the case for the rest schemes. As the 
volume of the legitimate users is low, only a small num-
ber of requests reaches the target after several retries, 
even in the case of speak-up. The related mechanisms 
start to be effective only for a quite high volume of legiti-
mate participants (which is not the actual case). Neverthe-
less, even under these assumptions, the speak-up variants 
enable the processing for only a small number of links. As 
the server receives too many requests, both from the bots 
and the increased number of users, the connection is fur-
ther delayed and a successful communication takes more 
time. The speak-up variants increase significantly the traf-
fic burden on the network for low profit. The perfor-
mance of the CAPTCHA approach was even worse. As 
long as the legitimate links are fewer, it is harder to be 
queued in the server. The establishment of a connection 
takes also much time (as it would be expected) but the 
confidence on the request’s legitimacy is higher. On the 
other hand, WARDOG does not impose any additional 
connection establishment delays. The additional traffic 
load (alerts to the compromise machines) is low and quite 
gainful as it instantly stops the malicious traffic. Thus, the 
connected users are served in a timely manner, while in 
the cases of the rest schemes a successful interaction takes 
several ms or even secs due to the overall bandwidth al-
location. 
WARDOG’s effectiveness is far more advanced as it 
blocks the malicious activity instantly once an attack is 
exposed and permits the processing of user requests even 
when the volume of the legitimate entities is lower than 
the malicious ones. On the other side, the effectiveness of 
alternative schemes, like speak-up or CAPTCHA, is re-
vealed only when the legitimate nodes are more than the 
compromised ones. However, this is not the ordinary 
case, as the botnets are composed from several thousands 
of bots that transmit traffic concurrently, while the users 
that consume services at the same time are much fewer. 
Nevertheless, even under an optimal setting for the alter-
native solutions, WARDOG is computation-
al/communicational more efficient and does not impose 
any additional connection establishment overhead (i.e. 
like the CAPTHCA verification delay from the user). 
10 CONCLUSION 
The malicious botnet activity and the DDoS attacks are 
undoubtedly two of the most serious security issues 
across the Internet that challenge the growth rate and the 
public acceptance of online businesses and governmental 
services. In this paper, we propose a novel system, called 
 
Fig. 7. The mitigation effectiveness of the 4 schemes. 
TABLE 4 























































Prevention of bot in-
fection 
P Y N N N 
Block ongoing botnet 
attacks 
Y N P N P 
Forensics Y Y P Y N 
Cross-border investi-
gation 
Y N P P N 
Botnet exposure Y N P P N 
Bot-master conviction P N N P N 
Notations for the offered compliance with the feature’s main 
goal/functionality: yes (Y), no (N), or partial (P) 
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WARDOG, which works towards the exposure of the 
malicious infrastructure with the parallel collection of 
juridical evidence in order to accuse the liable wily hack-
ers. The main functionality is performed by the infected 
machine that blocks the malicious activity, once an attack 
is detected. We prove that the proposed mechanism can 
mitigate DDoS attacks effectively and efficiently, even 
with not the absolute compliance from all users. Through 
crowdsourcing, the involved device owners can then con-
tribute to the further disclosure and neutralization of the 
botnet infrastructure. A preliminary implementation on 
real IoT devices exhibits the applicability of our solution 
in real applications. Finally, WARDOG facilitates an au-
tomatic generation of forensic documentation, thus aug-
menting and enhancing the international cybercrime in-
vestigation process. Our proposal offers unique features 
in comparison with the state-of-the-art systems and can 
provide runtime protection, mitigating instantly the mali-
cious effects. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
This work has received funding from the European Union 
Horizon’s 2020 research and innovation programme 
H2020-DS-SC7-2017, under grant agreement No. 786890 
(THREAT-ARREST). 
REFERENCES 
[1] Microsoft, ‘Microsoft security intelligence report,’ Microsoft, 
vols. 9-17, 2010-2014. 
[2] S. T. Zargar, J. Joshi and D. Tipper, ‘A survey of defense mecha-
nisms against Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) flooding at-
tacks,’ IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials, IEEE, vol. 15, 
issue 4, pp. 2046-2069, March 28, 2013. 
[3] S. Liu, ‘Surviving distributed Denial-of-Service attacks,’ IT Pro-
fessional, IEEE, vol. 11, issue 5, pp. 51-53, 29 September, 2009. 
[4] S. M. Specht and R. B. Lee, ‘Distributed Denial of Service: tax-
onomies of attacks, tools and countermeasures,’ 17th International 
Conference on Parallel and Distributed Computing Systems 
(ICPADS), San Francisco, CA, USA, pp. 543-550, September 15-
17, 2004. 
[5] H. Asghari, M. J. G. van Eeten and J. M. Bauer, ‘Economics of 
fighting botnets: lessons from a decade of mitigation,’ IEEE Se-
curity & Privacy, IEEE, vol. 13, issue 5, pp. 16-23, October 28, 
2015. 
[6] A. K. Sood, S. Zeadally and R. J. Enbody, ‘An empirical study of 
HTTP-based financial botnets,’ IEEE Transactions on Dependable 
and Secure Computing, IEEE, vol. 13, issue 2, pp. 236-251, March-
April 1, 2016. 
[7] T. Moore, R. Clayton and R. Anderson, ‘The economics of 
online crime,’ The Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 23, no. 3, 
pp. 3-20, 2009. 
[8] J. J. C. de Santanna, R. M. van Rijswijk, R. J. Hofstede, A. Sper-
otto, M. Wierbosch, L. Z. Granville and A. Pras, ‘Booters – an 
analysis of DDoS-as-a-Service attacks,’ IFIP/IEEE International 
Symposium on Integrated Network Management (IM), IFIP/IEEE, 
Ottawa, Canada, pp. 243-251, May 11-15, 2015. 
[9] S. Khattak, N. R. Ramay, K. R. Khan, A. A. Syed and S. A. Kha-
yam, ‘A taxonomy of botnet behavior, detection, and defense,’ 
IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials, IEEE, vol. 16, issue 2, 
pp. 898-924, October 2, 2014. 
[10] I. Brown and C. Marsden, ‘Co-regulating Internet security: the 
London Action Plan,’ Academic Symposium on Global Internet 
Governance Academic Network (GigaNet), SSRN, Rio de Janeiro, 
Brazil, pp. 1-18, November 11, 2007. 
[11] A. Garcia and B. Horowitz, ‘The potential for underinvestment 
in Internet security: implications for regulatory policy,’ Journal 
of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 31, issue 1, pp. 37-55. Feb-
ruary, 2007. 
[12] J. Habibi, D. Midi, A. Mudgerikar and E. Bertino, ‘Heimdall: 
mitigating the Internet of Insecure Things,’ IEEE Internet of 
Things Journal, IEEE, vol. 4, issue 4, pp. 968-978, May 17, 2017. 
[13] Z. Lu, W. Wang and C. Wang, ‘On the evolution and impact of 
mobile botnets in wireless networks,’ IEEE Transactions on Mo-
bile Computing, IEEE, vol. 15, issue 9, pp. 2304-2316, September 
1, 2016. 
[14] A. Karim, S. A. A. Shah, R. B. Salleh, M. Arif, R. M. Noor and S. 
Shamshirband, ‘Mobile botnet attacks – an emerging threat: 
classification, review and open issues,’ KSII Transactions on In-
ternet and Information Systems, TIIS, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 1471-1492, 
April 30, 2015. 
[15] P. Traynor, M. Lin, M. Ongtang, V. Rao, T. Jaeger, P. Mc Daniel 
and T. L. Porta, ‘On cellular botnets: measuring the impact of 
malicious devices on a cellular network core,’ 16th ACM Confer-
ence on Computer and Communications Security (CSS), ACM, Chi-
cago, Illinois, USA, pp. 223-234, November 9-13, 2009. 
[16] M. Antonakakis et al., ‘Understanding the Mirai botnet,’ 26th 
Usenix Security Symposium (SS), Vancouver, BC, Canada, pp. 
1093-1110, August 16-18, 2017. 
[17] J. Fruhlinger, ‘The Mirai botnet explained: how teen scammers 
and CCTV cameras almost brought down the Internet,’ CSO 
Online, article 3258748, 
https://www.csoonline.com/article/3258748/security/the-
mirai-botnet-explained-how-teen-scammers-and-cctv-cameras-
almost-brought-down-the-internet.html, March 9, 2018. 
[18] A. Almalawi, A. Fahad, Z. Tari, A. Alamri, R. AlGhamdi and A. 
Y. Zomaya, ‘An efficient data-driven clustering technique to de-
tect attacks in SCADA systems,’ IEEE Transactions on Information 
Forensics and Security, IEEE, vol. 11, issue 5, pp. 893-906, May, 
2016. 
[19] B. Stone-Gross, M. Cova, B. Gilbert, R. Kemmerer, C. Kruegel 
and G. Vigna, ‘Analysis of a botnet takeover,’ IEEE Security & 
Privacy, IEEE, vol. 9, issue 1, pp. 64-72, September 2, 2010. 
[20] S. Shin, G. Gu, N. Reddy and C. P. Lee, ‘A large-scale empirical 
study of Conflicker,’ IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics 
and Security, IEEE, vol. 7, issue 2, pp. 676-690, April 1, 2012. 
[21] A. M. Konovalov, I. V. Kotenko and A. V. Shorov, ‘Simulation-
based study of botnets and defense mechanisms against them,’ 
Journal of Computer and Systems Sciences International, Springer, 
vol. 52, no. 1, pp. 43-65, January 2013. 
[22] Y. Bekeneva, N. Shipilov, K, Borisenko, and A. Shorov, “Simula-
tion of DDoS-attacks and protection mechanisms against 
them,” IEEE NW Russia Young Researchers in Electrical and Elec-
tronic Engineering Conference (ElConRusNW), IEEE, St. Peters-
burg, Russia, pp. 49-55, February 2-4, 2015. 
[23] E. Cooke, F. Jahanian and D. Mc Pherson, ‘The zombie round-
up: understanding, detecting, and disrupting botnets,’ Usenix 
Workshop on Steps to Reducing Unwanted Traffic on the Internet 
(SRUTI), Cambridge, MA, USA, pp. 1-6, July 7, 2005. 
[24] Y. Nadji, R. Perdisci and M. Antonakakis, ‘Still beheading Hy-
dras: botnet takedowns then and now,’ IEEE Transactions on De-
14 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SUSTAINABLE COMPUTING,  MANUSCRIPT ID 
 
pendable and Secure Computing, IEEE, vol. 14, issue 5, pp. 535-
549, October 29, 2015. 
[25] Y. G. Dantas, V. Nigam and I. E. Fonseca, ‘A selective defense 
for application layer DDoS attacks,’ Joint Intelligence and Security 
Informatics Conference (JISIC), IEEE, The Hague, Netherlands, 
pp. 75-82, September 24-26, 2014. 
[26] O. Osanaiye, K.-K. R. Choo and M. Dlodlo, ‘Distributed denial 
of service (DDoS) resilience in cloud: review and conceptual 
cloud DDoS mitigation framework,’ Journal of Network and Com-
puter Applications, Elsevier, vol. 67, issue C, pp. 147-165, May, 
2016. 
[27] C. Basile and A. Lioy, ‘Analysis of application-layer filtering 
policies with application to HTTP,’ IEEE/ACM Transactions on 
Networking, IEEE/ACM, vol. 23, issue 1, pp. 28-41, February 
2015. 
[28] E. Cambiaso, G. Papaleo and M. Aiello, ‘Taxonomy of slow DoS 
attacks to web applications,’ International Conference on Security 
in Computer Networks and Distributed Systems (SNDS), Springer, 
CCIS, vol. 335, pp. 195-204, Thiruvananthepuram, India, Octo-
ber 11-12, 2012. 
[29] P. Wang, B. Aslam and C. C. Zou, ‘Peer-to-peer botnets,’ Hand-
book of Information and Communication Security, Springer, pp. 
335-350, 2010. 
[30] P. Wang, S. Sparks and C. C. Zou, ‘An advanced hybrid peer-to-
peer botnet,’ IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Compu-
ting, IEEE, vol. 7, issue 2, pp. 113-127, July 18, 2008. 
[31] D. J. Sanok Jr, ‘An analysis of how antivirus methodologies are 
utilized in protecting computers from malicious code,’ ACM In-
formation Security Curriculum Development (InfoSecCD) Confer-
ence, ACM, Kennesaw, GA, USA, pp. 142-144, September 23-24, 
2005. 
[32] O. Sukwong, H. Kim and J. Hoe, ‘Commercial antivirus soft-
ware effectiveness: an empirical study,’ Computer, IEEE, vol. 44, 
issue 3, pp. 63-70, March 2011. 
[33] J. Oberheide, E. Cooke and F. Jahanian, ‘CouldAV: N-version 
antivirus in the network cloud,’ 17th Usenix Security Symposium 
(SS), San Jose, CA, USA, pp. 91-106, July 28 – August 01, 2008. 
[34] Y. Wang, Y. Xiang, J. Zhang, W. Zhou, G. Wei and L. T. Yang, 
‘Internet traffic classification using constrained clustering,’ 
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems, IEEE, 
vol. 25, issue 11, Novermber, 2014. 
[35] P. Bazydlo, K. Lasota and A. Kozakiewicz, ‘Botnet fingerprint-
ing: anomaly detection in SMTP conversations,’ IEEE Security & 
Privacy, IEEE, vol. 15, issue 6, pp. 25-32, November 28, 2017. 
[36] S. N. Shiaeles, V. Katos, A. S. Karakos and B. K. Papadopoulos, 
‘Real time DDoS detection using fuzzy estimators,’ Computers & 
Security, Elsevier, vol. 31, issue 6, pp. 782-790, September, 2012. 
[37] W. Xiong, H. Hu, N. Xiong, L. T. Yang, W.-C. Peng, X. Wang and 
Z. Qu, ‘Anomaly secure detection methods by analyzing dy-
namic characteristics of the network traffic in cloud communi-
cations,’ Informatics and Computer Science, Intelligent Sys-
tems, Applications: An International Journal, vol. 258, pp. 403-
415, February, 2014. 
[38] L. F. Maino, A. L. P. Gomez, F. J. G. Clemente, M. G. Perez and 
G. M. Perez, ‘A self-adaptive deep learning-based system for 
anomaly detection in 5G networks,’ IEEE Access, Special Section 
on Cyber-Physical-Social Computing and Networking, IEEE, 
vol. 6., issue 1, pp. 7700-7712, February 7, 2018. 
[39] O. Y. Al-Jarrah, O. Alhussein, P. D. Yoo, S. Muhaidat, K. Taha 
and K. Kim, ‘Data randomization and cluster-based partition-
ing for botnet intrusion detection,’ IEEE Transactions on Cyber-
netics, IEEE, vol. 46, issue 8, pp. 1796-1806, August 2016. 
[40] M. Albanese, S. Jajodia and S. Venkatesan, ‘Defending from 
stealthy botnets using moving target defenses,’ IEEE Security & 
Privacy, IEEE, vol. 16, issue 1, pp. 92-97, February 6, 2018. 
[41] S. Khattak, Z. Ahmed, A. A. Syed and S. A. Khayam, ‘BotFlex: a 
community-driven tool for botnet detection, ’Journal of Net-
work and Computer Applications, Elsevier, vol. 58, pp. 144-154, 
December, 2015. 
[42] J. Feng, L. T. Yang, G. Dai, W. Whang and D. Zou, ‘A secure 
higher-order Lanczos-based orthogonal tensor SVD for Big Da-
ta reduction,’ IEEE Transactions on Big Data, IEEE, Early Ac-
cess, pp. 1-14, February 2018. 
[43] A. Aqil, A. O.F. Atya, T. Jaeger, S.V. Krishnamurthy, K. Levitt, P. 
D. Mc Daniel, J. Rowe and A. Swami, ‘Detection of stealthy 
TCP-based DoS attacks,’ Military Communications Conference 
(MILCON), IEEE, Tampa, FL, USA, pp. 348-353, October 26-28, 
2015. 
[44] S. Newman, ‘Service providers: the gatekeepers of Internet 
security,’ Network Security, Elsevier, vol. 2017, issue 5, pp. 5-7, 
May 2017. 
[45] B. Rowe, D. Wood, D. Reeves and F. Braun, ‘The role of Internet 
Service Providers in cyber security,’ Institute for Homeland Secu-
rity Solutions, IHSS Cyber Reports, Duke University, pp. 1-12, 
June, 2011. 
[46] X. Li, J. Wang and X. Zhang, ‘Botnet detection technology based 
on DNS,’ Future Internet, MDPI, vol. 9, issue 4, article 55, pp. 1-
12, September 25, 2017. 
[47] L. Xu, X. Yu, Y. Feng, F. Han, J. Hu and Z. Tari, ‘Comparative 
studies of router-based observation schemes for anomaly detec-
tion in TCP/UDP networks,’ IEEE International Conference on In-
dustrial Technology (ICIT), IEEE, pp. 1832-1837, Taipei, Taiwan, 
March 14-17, 2016. 
[48] P. Chatziadam, I. G. Askoxylakis and A. Fragkiadakis, ‘A net-
work telescope for early warning intrusion detection,’ 2nd Inter-
national Conference on Human Aspects of Information Security, Pri-
vacy, and Trust (HCI), Springer, Heraklion, Greece, LNCS, vol. 
8533, pp. 11-22, June 22-27, 2014. 
[49] P. Chatziadam, I. G. Askoxylakis, N. E. Petroulakis and A. G. 
Fragkiadakis, ‘Early warning intrusion detection system,’ 7th In-
ternational Conference on Trust and Trustworthy Computing 
(TRUST), Springer, Heraklion, Greece, LNCS, vol. 8564, pp. 222-
223, June 30 – July 2, 2014. 
[50] R. Hunt and S. Zeadally, ‘Network Forensics: an analysis of 
techniques, tools, and trends,’ Computer, IEEE, vol. 45, issue 12, 
pp. 36-43, July 30, 2012. 
[51] J. I. James and P. Gladyshev, ‘A survey of international coopera-
tion in digital investigations,’ 7th International Conference on Digi-
tal Forensics and Cyber Crime (ICDF2C), Springer, Seoul, South 
Korea, LNICST, vol. 157, pp. 103-114, October 6-8, 2015. 
[52] P. Du and A. Nakao, ‘DDoS defense deployment with network 
egress and ingress filtering,’ IEEE International Conference on 
Communications (ICC), IEEE, Cape Town, South Africa, pp. 1-6, 
May 23-27, 2010. 
[53] S. Chen and Y. Tang, ‘Slowing down Internet worms,’ 24th Inter-
national Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS), 
IEEE, Tokyo, Japan, pp. 1-8, March 26, 2004. 
[54] M. Nasu, ‘Communication device, software update device, 
software update system, software update method, and pro-
gram,’ US Patents, US7555657B2, Ricoh Co Ltd, pp. 1-51, June 
HATZIVASILIS ET AL.:  WARDOG: AWARENESS DETECTION WATCHDOG FOR BOTNET INFECTION ON THE HOST DEVICE 15 
 
30, 2009. 
[55] C. R. Wysocki and A. Ward, ‘Secure software updates,’ US Pa-
tents, US9489496B2, Apple Inc., pp. 1-21, November 8, 2016. 
[56] S. Yu, ‘Network identity certificate pinning,’ US Patents, 
US9473487B2, Bank of America Corp, pp. 1-16, October 18, 
2016. 
[57] C. Evans, C. Palmer and R. Sleevi, ‘Public key pinning exten-
sion for HTTP,’ IETF, RFC7469, Google Inc., pp. 1-28, April, 
2015. 
[58] D. Barrera and P. C. van Oorschot, ‘Secure software installation 
on smartphones,’ IEEE Security & Privacy, IEEE, vol. 9, issue 3, 
pp. 42-48, May-June, 2011. 
[59] B. Blanchet, “Automatic verification of security protocols in the 
symbolic model: the verifier ProVerif,” Foundations of Security 
Analysis and Design (FOSAD) VII, Springer, LNCS, vol. 8604, pp. 
54-87, 2014. 
[60] I. Ristic, ‘OpenSSL cookbook,’ Feisty Duck, pp. 1-94, March, 
2016. 
[61] N. Kobeissi and N. Kulatova, ‘Ledger design language: design-
ing and deploying formally verified public ledgers,’ Cryptology 
ePrint Archive, IACR, report 416, pp. 1-5, May 4, 2018. 
[62] K. Taha and P. D. Yoo, ‘Using the spanning tree of a criminal 
network for identifying its leaders,’ IEEE Transactions on Infor-
mation Forensics and Security, IEEE, vol. 12, issue 2, pp. 445-453, 
February, 2017. 
[63] M. Kumar, ‘Biggest-ever DDoS attack (1.35 Tbs) hits GitHub 
website,’ The Hacker News, March 1, 2018. 
[64] K. I. Sgouras, A. N. Kyriakidis, and D. P. Labridis, “Short-term 
risk assessment of botnet attacks on advanced metering infra-
structure,” IET Cyber-Physical Systems: Theory & Applications, 
IET, vol. 2, issue 3, pp. 143-151, October, 2017. 
[65] P. Piegg, J. M. de Oca, F. Lgg, P. Cazenave, A. Haydock, J. Sati-
rom and N. Newky, “PyGeolpMap,” GitHub, 
https://github.com/pieqq/PyGeoIpMap, 2017. 
[66] D. Dagon, G. Gu and C. P. Lee, ‘A taxonomy of botnet struc-
tures,’ Botnet Detection, Springer, ADIS, vol. 36, Boston, MA, 
USA, pp. 143-164, December 10-14, 2008. 
[67] G. F. Riley and T. R. Henderson, ‘The ns-3 network simulator,’ 
Modeling and Tools for Network Simulation, Springer, edition 1, 
pp. 15-34, June 29, 2010. 
[68] G. Hatzivasilis, I. Papaefstathiou, D. Plexousakis, C. Manifavas 
and N. Papadakis, ‘AmbISPDM: managing embedded systems 
in ambient environment and disaster mitigation planning,’ Ap-
plied Intelligence, Springer, vol. 48, issue 6, pp. 1623-1643, August 
30, 2017. 
[69] K. Fysarakis, G. Hatzivasilis, I. Papaefstathiou and C. Mani-
favas, ‘RtVMF – a secure real-time vehicle management frame-
work with critical incident,’ IEEE Pervasive Computing Magazine 
(PVC) – Special Issue on Smart Vehicle Spaces, IEEE, vol. 15, issue 
1, pp. 22-30, January 21, 2016. 
[70] G. Hatzivasilis, I. Papaefstathiou and C. Manifavas, ‘SCOTRES: 
secure routing for IoT and CPS,’ IEEE Internet of Things Journal 
(IoT-J), IEEE, vol. 4, issue 6, pp. 2129-2141, September 15, 2017. 
[71] The legion of the Bouncy Castle, ‘Bouncy Castle Crypto APIs,’ 
GitHub, https://github.com/bcgit and bouncycastle.org, Janu-
ary 27, 2014. 
[72] M. Walfish, M. Vutukuru, H. Balakrishnan, D. Karger and S. 
Shenker, ‘DDoS defense by offense,’ ACM Transactions on Com-
puter Systems, ACM, vol. 28, issue 1, article 3, pp. 1-54, March, 
2010. 
[73] M. Mehta, K. Thapar, G. Oikonomou and J. Mirkovic, ‘Combin-
ing speak-up with DefCOM for improved DDoS defense,’ In-
ternational Conference on Communications (ICC), IEEE, Beijing, 
China, pp. 1708-1714, May 19-23, 2008. 
[74] A. S. Sairam, S. Roy and S. K. Dwivedi, ‘Using CAPTCHA se-
lectively to mitigate HTTP-based attacks,’ Global Communica-
tions Conference (GLOBECOM), IEEE, San Diego, USA, pp. 1-6, 
December 6-10, 2015. 
[75] K. J. Singh and T. De, ‘A novel approach of detection and miti-
gation of DDoS attack,’ International Conference on Computer 
Science, Data Mining & Mechanical Engineering (ICCDMME), 
Bangkok, Thailand, pp. 62-67, April 20-21, 2015. 
[76] S. Gao, M. Mohamed, N. Saxena and C. Zhang, ‘Emerging-
image motion CAPTCHAs: vulnerabilities of existing designs, 
and countermeasures,’ IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Se-
cure Computing, IEEE, Early Access, pp. 1-14, June, 2017. 
[77] S. S. Brown, N. DiBari and S. Bhatia, ‘I am ‘totally’ human: by-
passing the reCAPTCHA,’ 13th International Conference on Signal-
Image Technology & Internet-Based Systems (SITIS), IEEE, Jaipur, 
India, pp. 9-12, December 4-7, 2017. 
 
Dr. G. Hatzivasilis holds a PhD from the ECE department of the 
Technical University of Crete, Greece. He received his M.Sc. and 
B.Sc. in Computer Science from the University of Crete. He also 
received a certificate in Management of Information Systems (MIS) 
from the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens. His re-
search interests include IoT and CPS systems, lightweight cryptog-
raphy, trust management, and ambient intelligence. 
 
O. Soultatos is a PhD candidate at the City University of London 
and researcher at ICS-FORTH. He received his BSc in Computer 
Science from the University of Crete. He is interested in the design 
and implementation of IoT and SDN security and privacy solutions. 
 
P. Chatziadam holds a BSc in Computer Science from the City Uni-
versity of New York. He is a key member of FORTHcert where he 
fulfills the role of Network Security Specialist. Areas of expertise 
include Intrusion Detection & Prevention, Governance & Audit, Ethi-
cal Hacking, System & Network Forensics, Security Architecture & 
Compliance as well as Incident Handling & Analysis. 
 
Dr. K. Fysarakis holds a PhD from the ECE department of the 
Technical University of Crete, Greece. He received an MSc in Infor-
mation Security from Royal Holloway, University of London, is an 
IRCA certified ISO 27001:2005 auditor and a member of the IEEE. 
His interests revolve around the security of embedded systems and 
the challenges that arise with the wider adoption of ubiquitous com-
puting. 
 
Dr. I. Askoxylakis holds a Diploma in Physics from the University of 
Crete, a Master of Science in Communication Engineering from the 
Technical University of Munich and a PhD in Engineering from the 
University of Bristol. He is Head of the FORTHcert. His research 
interests lie in the fields of system and communication security. 
 
Dr. S. Ioannidis is a Principal Researcher at FORTH-ICS, an Ad-
junct Professor at the Computer Science Department of the Universi-
ty of Crete and a Marie-Curie Fellow. He received his Doctorate 
degree from the University of Pennsylvania in 2005. His areas of 
interest include systems security, privacy and security policy, where 
he has dozens of publications in international, peer-reviewed, jour-
nals and conferences. He has also served as a member of the 
Technical Program Committee of leading conferences, such as ACM 
CSS, Usenix Security, etc. 
 
G. Alexandris holds a Diploma in Electrical Engineering from the 
Technical University of Munich, Germany, and an MSc in Information 
Networking from Carnegie Mellon University, USA. His research 
interests include scalable architectures and secure cloud systems 
16 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SUSTAINABLE COMPUTING,  MANUSCRIPT ID 
 
integration, where he is currently pursuing a PhD at the Bourne-
mouth University, UK. 
 
Dr. V. Katos obtained a Diploma in Electrical Engineering from 
Democritus University of Thrace in Greece, an MBA from Keele 
University in the UK and a PhD in Computer Science (network secu-
rity and cryptography) from Aston University. He is a certified Com-
puter Hacking Forensic Investigator (CHFI). He has worked in the 
Industry as Information Security Consultant and served as an expert 
witness in Information Security for a criminal court in the UK and a 
misdemeanor court in Greece. His research falls in the area of digital 
forensics and incident response. 
 
Dr. G. Spanoudakis. Bsc, Msc, PhD. George Spanoudakis is Pro-
fessor at City, University of London. His research interests are in 
software systems security and service oriented systems. 
